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Thornburgh v. Abbott: Slamming the Prison
Gates on Constitutional Rights
"[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not in-
consistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system."*
I. INTRODUCTION
In January and August of 1975, two prison inmates died of asthma
attacks at the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.1
The prison infirmary had only one respirator, which was nonfunc-
tional at the time of the first death and still inoperative at the time of
the second death.2 An article in Labyrinth, a magazine published by
the Committee for Prisoner Humanity and Justice,3 detailing the
deaths, concluded that the prisoners were murdered by neglect.4
Prison officials at Marion Federal Penitentiary refused to deliver
that particular publication of Labyrinth to subscribing inmates, and
returned the magazine to its publisher.5 The Marion officials who re-
jected that issue of Labyrinth admitted having no reason to do so. 6
The legal issue arising from this scenario is easily identified: Is the
content-based rejection of the magazine by prison officials an uncon-
* Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
1. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1885 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting). William Lowe died in January 1975, and Joseph Jones, Jr., died in August,
1975. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. At the time of William Lowe's death, it was known that the respirator was
broken. Joseph Jones' death was hastened not only by the broken respirator, but by
the administration of a tranquilizer, a treatment that is contraindicated by an asthma
attack. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
3. d. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
4. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). "'Jones, who was convicted of
bank robbery and sentenced to 10 years in prison, was in fact, sentenced to death and
was murdered by neglect."' Ad (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Medi-
cal Murder, supra note 1, at 5) (emphasis in original).
5. The circumstances of Jones' death eventually came before the Supreme Court
in an action by Jones' mother against prison officials. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980); Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1885-86 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The
concurrence in Thornburgh observed that the Labyrinth article on inadequate federal
prison medical treatment was newsworthy and of great public importance. Id. (Ste-
vens, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Activism,
16 VAL. U.L. REV. 439, 455-56 (1982) (discussing the factual history and eventual reso-
lution of Carlson).
6. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1886 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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stitutional violation of the first amendment free speech rights7 of
both the subscribing prisoners and the magazine's publisher?
In Thornburgh v. Abbott,8 the Supreme Court recently held that
the above actions on the part of the prison officials did not violate the
first amendment rights of either publisher or prisoner.9 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court was forced to decide what standard of re-
view to apply to prison regulations limiting the access of publishers
to inmates who willingly seek' said publishers' point of view through
subscription.10 The Court, in deciding upon a standard of review, was
limited to a choice between two standards created by two previous
Supreme Court decisions."1
Procunier v. Martinez12 established a two-part standard of review
requiring the regulation in question to (1) "further an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression," and (2) "be no greater than necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest involved."'13 Tur-
ner v. Saqfey,14 on the other hand, simply required that the regula-
tion or practice in question be "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests."' 5 In Thornburgh, the Court rejected the Mar-
tinez standard and expressly adopted the more lenient Safley reason-
ableness standard in approaching free speech questions in the prison
context.16
This Note discusses the Thornburgh decision in light of first
amendment prison context cases. As in Thornburgh, the emphasis
will be on the conflict between the Safley and Martinez decisions.
The differing standards of review, the decisions, and their subsequent
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech .. ")
8. 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
9. Id. at 1884-85. The Supreme Court held that the regulations allowing such ac-
tion on the part of the Marion prison officials were facially valid. Id. The question of
whether the regulations were constitutionally valid as applied was remanded, but the
Court's discussion leads to the conclusion that the regulations will be found valid as
applied as well. See iifra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
10. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1878-79.
11. A specific line of Supreme Court cases exists involving free speech rights in
prison settings. The evolution of these cases started with Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974), and progressed to Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). These two cases
adopted differing standards of review, creating a situation ripe for resolution by the
Thornburgh Court.
12. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
13. Id at 413; see infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
14. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
15. Id. at 89; see also infra notes 92, 94-101 and accompanying text.
16. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1881. The Court further held that the standard of
review established in Marinez should be limited to regulations concerning outgoing
correspondence. Id.; see also infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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impact upon Thornburgh will be analyzed in light of the prison regu-
lations or actions at issue in each case.
This Note begins in section II with a brief history of first amend-
ment free speech cases in the context of prisoners' rights, and pro-
vides a background of the state of the law in this area prior to the
Thornburgh decision. Section III discusses the facts of Thornburgh,
and section IV analyzes in detail the majority and dissenting opin-
ions. Section V examines the probable impact of this case on the con-
stitutional analysis of future prisoners' rights cases. Finally, section
VI presents a brief summary of the author's conclusions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to Procunier v. Martinez, federal courts adopted a broad
hands-off attitude toward prison administration problems.17 This
hands-off attitude allowed the courts to evade or deny review of cases
involving prisoners' rights issues.' 8 Essentially, this policy functioned
as a jurisdictional bar to prisoners' constitutional complaints brought
to the federal courts, as the courts effectively declared that prisoners
had no constitutional rights.19 Reasons for these avoidance tactics va-
17. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404. The Court stated that this attitude has been fos-
tered by the difficulties inherent in prison administration, which the Court found "too
apparent to warrant explication." Id. The Court believed that the problems of prisons
are too complex to be resolved by judicial decree, as the courts are ill-equipped to deal
with the urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Id. at 404-05. "Histori-
cally, courts refused to hear prisoners' complaints or to interfere with the administra-
tion of prisons." Note, The New Standard of Review for Prisoners'Rights: A "Turner"
for the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 399 (1988); see also Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish
in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison Adminis-
tration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212-13 (1980) (emphasizing rationales un-
derlying denial of jurisdiction over prisoners' complaints and erosion of this position in
the lower courts).
18. Note, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz The State of Prisoners' Religious Free Exer-
cise Rights, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 453, 458 (1988) [hereinafter Religious Free Exercise]. Spe-
cifically, the "hands-off" doctrine provided that "'courts are without power to
supervise prison administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regu-
lations."' Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Re-
view the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 506 (1963) (quoting Banning v.
Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954)); see also Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) (convict is the "slave of the state").
Further, a hands-off approach frees prison personnel to exercise virtually unlimited
discretion over the day-to-day conditions of imprisonment, "short of engaging in the
most egregiously abusive practices." Wecht, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial
Review of Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J. 815, 820 (1987).
19. Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: A
Reappraisal, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 212, 220-21 (1977).
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ried and included the difficulty of prison administration, 20 the judici-
ary's inability to deal with prison administrative problems,21 prison
officials' expertise in the area of prison administration,22 federal-
ism, 23 separation of powers,24 and the notion that prison officials
should be afforded deference in their decisions.25
As a result of the tension between the traditional policy of judicial
restraint regarding prisoner complaints and the need to protect pris-
oners' constitutional rights, the federal courts have adopted varied
and inconsistent approaches to the problem.2 6 In regard to censor-
ship of prisoner mail, some courts have maintained a strict hands-off
approach.27 For example, the Second Circuit has required only that
the censorship of prisoner mail be supported by a "rational prison
system."28 On the other extreme, some courts have required a com-
20. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); Bumgarner v. Bloodworth,
768 F.2d 297, 300-01 (8th Cir. 1985).
21. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974); Main Road v. Aytch, 522
F.2d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Swygert, supra note 5, at 454 (judiciary lacks
both expertise and experience in prison administration).
22. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754
F.2d 1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1985); Special Project, Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical In-
quiry Into the Nature of Prison Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REV. 919, 921 (1974)
("[P]rison officials are experts and it is better to defer to their judgment than risk
frustration of penological objectives by ill-advised judicial meddling.").
23. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Main Road, 522 F.2d at 1085; Hall v. Maryland,
433 F. Supp. 756, 778-79 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Carter v. Mandel, 573 F.2d 172 (4th Cir. 1978); see also Note, supra note 17, at 399
n.29 (noting that "a hands-off position promotes federalism by precluding federal in-
tervention on behalf of state prisoners") (citing Haas, Judicial Politics and Correc-
tional Reforn: An Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off" Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L.
REV. 795, 797).
24. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Goff v. Nix, 803 F.2d 358, 362 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 835 (1987); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206, 209-10 (6th Cir. 1983);
Feiler v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir. 1978); Wooden v. Norris, 637 F. Supp. 543,
555 (M.D. Tenn. 1986); Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 175, 181 (1970) (discussion and criticism of the notion that judicial inter-
vention would violate the separation of powers doctrine); Millemann, Protected Inmate
Liberties: A Case for Judicial Responsibility, 53 OR. L. REV. 29, 36 (1973).
25. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321
(1972) (per curiam). Another less common justification for the adoption of the hands-
off doctrine is that prison officials cannot be forced to appear in court because they
possess sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Williams v. Craven, 273 F. Supp. 649 (C.D. Cal.
1967); Black v. Stanley, 270 F. Supp. 993 (D. Kan. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 926
(1968); Delaney v. Shobe, 235 F. Supp. 662 (D. Ore. 1964). See generally Note, Prison-
ers'Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1294-97 (1969).
26. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 406.
27. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964); see also Krupnick
v. Crouse, 366 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1966); Leo v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965)
(hands-off approach appropriate except in cases in which mail censorship rules are ap-
plied to discriminate against a particular racial or religious group); Pope v. Daggett,
350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965).
28. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971) (censorship of personal cor-
respondence does not lack support "in any rational and constitutionally acceptable con-
cept of a prison system"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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pelling state interest to justify censorship of prisoner mail.29 Other
similarly demanding standards have been phrased in terms of "clear
and present danger."30 And, finally, between the two extremes,
courts have applied more moderate "reasonableness" standards.31
A. Martinez and Its Progeny
Into this morass of confusion came Procunier v. Martinez. Clearly,
the issue of which standard of review to apply to prison mail censor-
ship regulations was ripe for decision. Resolution was necessary be-
cause, as matters stood, neither the prisoners' first amendment
interests nor the regulations of prison officials were certain of being
protected or enforced.3 2 The resulting uncertainty about the correct
constitutional standard led to repetitive, piecemeal litigation that
only perpetuated the involvement of the federal courts in the affairs
of prison administration. 33
1. The Issue Presented by Martinez
Thus, when Martinez came before the Supreme Court challenging,
among other things,34 censorship of prisoner mail, the Court decided
that the task before it was to formulate a standard of review for pris-
oner mail censorship that was responsive to both first amendment
29. See, e.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (decided on both equal
protection and first amendment grounds); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.
Wis. 1972); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. Most notable of the "reasonable" standards is the view that a "prison regula-
tion or practice which restricts the right of free expression that a prisoner would have
enjoyed if he had not been imprisoned must be related both reasonably and necessarily
to the advancement of some justifiable purpose of the imprisonment." Carothers v.
Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citations omitted); see also LeMon v.
Zelker, 358 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 896 (N.D.
Miss. 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973).
32. "On the one hand, the First Amendment interests implicated by censorship of
inmate correspondence are given only haphazard and inconsistent protection. On the
other, the uncertainty of the constitutional standard makes it impossible for correc-
tional officials to anticipate what is required of them .. " Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 407 (1973); see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra
note 17, at 404.
33. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 407. In addition, without a uniform standard of review,
prisoners' first amendment interests received, at best, only inconsistent and haphazard
protection. Id.; see also Note, supra note 17, at 404 n.49.
34. The class action in Martinez challenged not only censorship of prisoner mail,
but also a ban against the use of legal paraprofessionals and law students to conduct
attorney-client interviews with inmates. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398.
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concerns and the concerns of correctional officers.35 In formulating
that standard, the Martinez Court decided that more than just the
prisoners' first amendment rights were at issue. Also implicated
were the rights of those outside the prisons who were corresponding
with the prisoners.36 Any standard of review would have an impact
on the rights of third parties and, thus, needed to be considered with
third party rights in mind.37
Using this reasoning, the Martinez Court refused to justify censor-
ship of inmate correspondence solely on the basis of the legal status
of prisoners. 38 Rather, the Court turned to cases resolving incidental
restrictions on first amendment rights imposed in the furtherance of
legitimate governmental activities.39 From Tinker v. Des Moines
School District,40 Healy v. James,41 and United States v. O'Brien,42
35. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 407. Rather than answering the framed question, how-
ever, the Martinez court emphasized that censorship of personal correspondence re-
stricted not only the inmates' rights to free speech, but also worked an incidental
restriction of the first amendment rights of those outside the prison who were corre-
sponding with the inmates. Id. at 408-09; see also Note, supra note 17, at 404.
36. Censorship of direct personal correspondence between inmates and those with
a particularized interest in communicating with the inmates implicates more than just
the rights of prisoners. Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in commu-
nicating; therefore, censorship affects the rights of both. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408. In-
terestingly, however, the Supreme Court raised the issue of non-inmate
correspondent's rights sua sponte, without assertion of the rights by the prisoners. See
generally Comment, Backwash Benefits for Second Class Citizens: Prisoner's First
Amendment and Procedural Due Process Rights, 46 U. CoLO. L. REV. 377, 384-85, 390-
95 (1975).
37. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408. In developing its analysis, the Court "emphasized
the first amendment interests of persons corresponding with prisoners and did not dis-
tinguish between authors and recipients of inmate correspondence." Note, Constitu-
tionality of Regulations Restricting Prisoner Correspondence With the Media, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1988) (citing Martinez, 416 at 408-09). Further, the rights
of outsiders created a narrower basis of decision, enabling the Court to decline consid-
eration of the extent to which an individual's free speech survives incarceration. Rob-
bins viewed the case as a
[p]yrrhic victory, for Martinez expressly declined to rule that prisoners had
any communication rights, and instead based its holding on the outsiders' first
amendment rights.... As a result, the somewhat modified hands-off doctrine
and its companion, the withdrawal of privileges doctrine, remained a serious
barrier to the expansion of prisoners' rights ....
Robbins, supra note 17, at 214 (footnote omitted).
38. "[C]ensorship of prisoner mail works a consequential restriction on the First
and Fourteenth Amendments rights of those who are not prisoners." Martinez, 416
U.S. at 409.
39. The Martinez Court expressly declined to use cases involving questions of
"prisoners' rights" in order to develop a standard more accommodating of free citizens'
rights. Id.
40. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). "First Amendment guarantees must be applied in light of
the special characteristics of the .. .environment." Martinez, 416 U.S. at 410 (citing
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). Tinker involved the conflict between the free speech rights of
high school students and the need of the states and school officials to proscribe and
control conduct in the schools. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. The Martinez court noted that
Tinker's analysis focused on the "legitimate requirements of orderly school adminis-
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the Martinez Court distilled a rule allowing incidental restrictions on
first amendment liberties "by governmental action in furtherance of
legitimate and substantial state interest [sic] other than suppression
of expression." 43
Applying this rule to the prison context, the Court found an identi-
fiable governmental interest in the preservation of a prison's internal
order and discipline, the maintenance of institutional security against
escape or unauthorized entry, and prisoner rehabilitation.44 The
Court justified the imposition of certain restraints on inmate corre-
spondence by the legitimate governmental interest in the order and
security of penal institutions.45 In light of this determination of the
legitimate governmental interests at stake in a penal institution, the
Martinez Court announced a two-part standard for determining
whether a particular regulation or practice pertaining to inmate cor-
respondence constituted an impermissible restraint of first amend-
ment liberties.46
tration in order to ensure that the students were afforded maximum freedom of
speech consistent with those requirements." Martinez, 416 U.S. at 410.
41. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the question of the constitutionality of a state
college's refusal to grant official recognition to a politically active student organization
came before the Court. The college's fear of future disruption due to the purportedly
dangerous nature of the organization's political philosophy could not justify such an
infringement on the students' right of free association. Id. at 189-90. The right could
be limited, however, if necessary to prevent campus disruption. Id. at 189 n.20.
42. 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). The O'Brien case dealt with in-
cidental restrictions on free speech caused by the exercise of the governmental power
to conscript men for military service. O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration
certificate to dramatize his opposition to the draft. He was convicted of violating a law
prohibiting the destruction of registration certificates. In deciding the case, the Court
utilized a four-factor test, which included the furtherance of an important or substan-
tial government interest and the relation of the regulation to the suppression of free
expression. Id. at 377.
43. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 412.
44. Id. In discussing these governmental interests, the Court expressly avoided
the issues raised when a prison temporarily denies an inmate personal correspondence
as a disciplinary sanction. Id. at 412 n.12.
45. Id. at 412-13. Justifiable censorship can be found in situations such as the re-
fusal to send or deliver letters concerning escape plans or other criminal activity, in
addition to the refusal to transmit messages in code. Id. at 413.
46. Id This two-part test provides a heightened level of scrutiny that is consistent
with the three cases relied upon to formulate the test. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). Because the
test formulated by the Martinez Court was based upon the incidental free speech
rights of outsiders, the Court sidestepped the question of what standard of review to
apply when prison regulations restrict the freedom of speech. Note, supra note 17, at
404-05.
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2. The Martinez Test
Part one of the two-part test requires that "the regulation or prac-
tice in question must further an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." 47 Therefore,
there must be a showing by prison officials that a regulation author-
izing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial govern-
mental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.48 The second
part of the test requires that the resulting first amendment limita-
tions be "no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of
the particular governmental interest involved."49 Under this second
element of the test, a restriction on inmate correspondence that fur-
thers an important governmental interest in penal administration
will fail if its sweep is too broad.50 Prison administrators are given
some latitude in determining probable consequences;51 they are not
required to prove with certainty that adverse consequences would re-
sult from failure to censor a particular letter.5 2
Using this standard, the Court invalidated the regulations at issue
in Martinez.53 Those regulations allowed the censorship of "state-
ments that 'unduly complain,' or 'magnify grievances' [or] expression
of 'inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views'... ."54 The
47. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. The Court formulated this first prong of analysis by
reference to Healy, Tinker, and O'Brien. See supra note 46; see also supra notes 40-42
and accompanying text.
48. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. "Prison officials may not censor inmate correspon-
dence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions .... ." Id. Rather, the
Court placed the burden on prison officials to demonstrate that the censorship regula-
tion furthered at least one of the substantial governmental interests of security, order,
or rehabilitation. Id.
49. Id. This prong of the Martinez test is what caused the Turner court to formu-
late its own test in an effort to avoid interpretation as a least restrictive alternative
test. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
50. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413-14.
51. The Court recognized that it is essential to the proper discharge of an adminis-
trator's duty that the administrator be given "some latitude" to anticipate probable
consequences in allowing certain speech in a prison context. Id. at 414.
52. 1id "But any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must
be generally necessary to protect one or more legitimate governmental interests .. "
I&r Further, safeguards such as notification of censorship to intended recipients of cen-
sored mail, along with an opportunity to object, see Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 581
(10th Cir. 1980) (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418-19), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing Martinez), must be in
place to temper the discretion exercised by prison officials over censorship of prisoner
mail. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 417-18; Pittman v. Hutto, 448 F. Supp. 61, 62 (E.D. Va.
1978), qff'd, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979)).
53. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 415.
54. Id. Inmate correspondence was monitored under regulations promulgated by
the Director of the California Department of Corrections. Id. at 398. Director's Rule
2401 provided that "[t]he sending and receiving of mail is a privilege, not a right, and
any violation of the rules governing mail privileges either by you or by your correspon-
dents may cause suspension of the mail privileges." Id. at 399 n.1. Director's Rule 1201
provided: "INMATE BEHAVIOR: Always conduct yourself in an orderly manner. Do
1018
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Court stated that these regulations were practically an invitation to
individual prison officials to use their personal prejudices as the stan-
dard for prisoner mail censorship.5 5 Because the regulations were so
easily manipulated by personal bias, the Court found them to be too
broadly drafted to reach only material that might encourage vio-
lence.56 Further, the regulations were not limited to incoming
mail,57 leaving open the possibility of censorship of outgoing mail to
prevent complaints about prison life.58 In sum, the regulations at is-
sue were far broader than any legitimate interest of penal adminis-
tration could justify.5 9
Although the Martinez Court decided the constitutionality of the
prison regulations regarding outgoing mail, it did not articulate a
broad standard of review for general restrictions on prisoners' first
amendment rights.60 Martinez expressly reserved the question of the
proper standard of review to apply in prisoners' rights cases and re-
lied instead on an analysis that recognized the "problem of incidental
restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of
legitimate governmental activities." 61 Thus, the holding turned on
the fact that the challenged regulation caused an incidental restric-
not fight or take part in horseplay or physical encounters except as part of the regular
athletic program. Do not agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave in
any way which might lead to violence." The phrases "unduly complain" and "magnify
grievances" were undisputedly applied to personal correspondence. Id. at 399 n.2.
55. Id. at 415. The Court gave examples of how the regulations can suppress un-
welcome criticism. These examples included the rejection of letters that criticized
prison policy, rules, or officials, in addition to those "letters 'belittling staff or our judi-
cial system or anything connected with Department of Corrections.'" Id.
56. Id. at 416.
57. After the district court held that the original regulations were unconstitu-
tional, substantial revisions were made, including a distinction between incoming and
outgoing mail. Under the new regulations, outgoing mail could be disapproved for
mailing for reasons such as the threat of physical harm, criminal activity, escape plans,
or soliciting money from persons other than family members. See Martinez, 416 U.S.
at 416 n.15 (listing various grounds for disapproval of outgoing letters).
58. See supra note 55.
59. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 416.
60. See id. at 408 (stating that an inquiry into the extent to which prisoners may
claim first amendment rights is unnecessary); see also Calhoun, supra note 19, at 225;
Religious Free Exercise, supra note 18, at 461-62.
61. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 409.
[W]e reject any attempt to justify censorship of inmate correspondence merely
by reference to certain assumptions about the legal status of prisoners.... We
therefore turn for guidance, not to cases involving questions of "prisoners'
rights," but to decisions of this Court dealing with the general problem of inci-
dental restrictions on First Amendment liberties imposed in furtherance of le-
gitimate governmental activities.
Id
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tion on the rights of those who were not prisoners.6 2
3. The Martinez Progeny
In four cases following Martinez, the Court addressed those ques-
tions of prisoners' rights expressly reserved in Martinez.63 The first
of these cases, Pell v. Procunier,64 involved a constitutional challenge
to prison regulations prohibiting face-to-face media interviews with
specific inmates. The Court upheld these regulations because the in-
mates had other means of communicating with the outside world.65
The Court also noted that prison security is the most important ob-
jective of the correctional system,66 and that judgments regarding
prison security "are peculiarly within the province and professional
expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial
.evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated
their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer
to their expert judgment in such matters."67 Thus, the language of
Pell advocates deference to prison officials.68
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union69 involved prison regula-
tions that prohibited meetings of a prisoners' labor union, inmate so-
licitation of other inmates to join the union, and bulk mailings from
outside sources for distribution to other inmates. The Court held
62. See supra note 61; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86 (1987).
63. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. The question reserved by Marti-
nez is the proper standard of review to apply in cases involving prisoners' rights. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. at 409. This question was addressed in four cases following Martinez.
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
64. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
65. I& at 820-21. Specifically, several professional journalists requested interviews
with inmates Bly, Guile, and Spain. Id, at 820. Pursuant to section 415.071 of the Cali-
fornia Department of Corrections Manual, which prohibits such interviews, the re-
quests were denied. Id. Consequently, the inmates asserted that the rule violated
their first amendment right of free speech, while the media plaintiffs contended that
their first and fourteenth amendment rights were violated because their ability to
gather news was impaired, infringing upon their rights of freedom of the press. Id. at
820-21. The district court dismissed the media's claim, concluding that the rule effec-
tively protected whatever rights the press had to interview inmates because the media
could still enter the prison and conduct interviews with inmates encountered at ran-
dom. Id.
These alternate means of communicating with the outside world included visitation
rights and mail communication. Id at 827. In Turner, the Court explained that the
alternate means of communication available to the prisoners in Pell were relevant in
determining the scope of the burden on the prisoners' first amendment rights. Turner,
482 U.S. at 88.
66. Pell, 417 U.S. at 823.
67. Id. at 827.
68. "[W]hen the issue involves a regulation limiting one of several means of com-
munication by an inmate, the institutional objectives furthered by that regulation and
the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials in their attempt to serve
those interests are relevant in gauging the validity of the regulation." Id.
69. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
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that the regulations were "rationally related to the reasonable ...
objectives of prison administration."70 The Court found the prison
officials' concerns about potential problems caused by the activities of
the union to be reasonable,71 and noted that the regulations were no
broader than necessary to meet the comprehended threat.72
In Bell v. Wolf'wh,73 the first amendment challenge was to a regu-
lation precluding prisoners' receipt of hard-covered books unless
mailed directly from a publisher, book club, or bookstore.74 The
Court upheld the rule as a rational response to an obvious security
problem as testified to by prison officials. 75 Other factors also influ-
70. Id. at 129 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 822). The Court also determined that the
first amendment rights of the prison inmates were "barely implicated" by the prohibi-
tion on bulk mailings. Id. at 130. It has been contended that in Jones, the Court took a
restrictive view of prisoners' retained rights, its analysis appearing to minimally bal-
ance interests by applying a standard of review emphasizing deference to prison offi-
cials and the incompatibility of the exercise of certain rights with incarceration. Note,
supra note 17, at 409-10.
Jones invoked the restrictive reading of prisoner rights set forth in Price v. John-
ston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). Price stated that "[l]awful incarceration brings about the nec-
essary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system." Id at 285.
71. Jones, 433 U.S. at 133. By early 1975, the prisoners' union had approximately
2,000 inmate members throughout forty different prison units in North Carolina. 1d. at
122. Prison officials testified that the union would create many security and adminis-
tration problems. Id. at 126-27.
72. Id at 133. The decision in Jones may represent a retreat from Martinez and
Pell. Id. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's reasonableness ap-
proach abandons traditional first amendment analysis); see also Note, Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.: The "Hands-Off Doctrine" Revisited, 14 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 647, 661 (1978) (asserting that Jones represents a significant departure
from prior cases). But cf Robbins, supra note 17, at 215 (Jones appears to be more of
an extension of than a departure-from earlier rulings) (citing Berger, Withdrawal of
Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978)).
73. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Although pretrial detainees brought this case, the Court
suggested that its ruling was applicable to inmates as well. Id. at 546 n.28. For a gen-
eral discussion of Bell, see Note, Prisoners'Rights, Institutional Needs, and the Burger
Court, 72 VA. L. REV. 161, 182-85 (1986); see also Robbins, supra note 17.
/ 74. Bell, 441 U.S. at 530.
75. Id, at 550. Because there was no evidence of an exaggeration of the security
risk that prison officials testified to, the Court stated "the considered judgment of
these experts must control in the absence of prohibitions far more sweeping than those
involved here." Id. at 551 (citations omitted). Prison officials cited security concerns
that contraband could be concealed in book bindings and an administrative interest in
avoiding the additional staff time that would be required to inspect the books. Id. at
549. Officials testified that a proper search of a hardback book would require the re-
moval of both covers and a page-by-page leafing of every book to ensure that no drugs,
money, weapons, or other contraband were hidden in the item. Id. Accordingly, in-
spections would take considerable staff time. Id.
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enced the Court's decision, including the neutrality of the regulation,
alternate means for the inmates to obtain reading material, and the
jail's large library.76
Block v. Rutherford 77 involved a ban on contact visits.78 The Court
upheld this restriction on the ground that "responsible, experienced
administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such
visits will jeopardize the security of the facility" 79 and the regulation
was reasonably related to these security concerns.8 0
The Court decided these four "prisoners' rights" cases strictly on a
reasonableness basis,S1 rather than on a standard of heightened scru-
tiny. The Court focused its inquiry on whether the prison regulation
burdening fundamental rights was reasonably related to legitimate
penological objectives,82 or whether it represented an exaggerated re-
sponse to those concerns.8 3 Moreover, in each case, the Court advo-
cated granting judicial deference to the security decisions of prison
officials. It is in reliance on these standards, as applied in Pell, Bell,
Jones, and Block, that the Court decided Turner v. SJfley.84
76. Il at 552; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-28 (1974) (referring to
alternate channels of communication and the neutral operation of the regulation).
77. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
78. In Block, pretrial detainees challenged the prison's policy of denying all con-
tact visits and its practice of conducting random searches of cells in the detainee's ab-
sence. ld, at 578. Contact visits, while not expressly defined in Block, are those which
allow actual physical contact between an inmate or detainee and the visitor. I&
79. Block, 468 U.S. at 589. "Although this case does not involve first amendment
rights, it is illustrative of the Supreme Court's continuing reaffirmation of deference to
prison officials even in the face of a total ban on detainees' interests in contact visits."
Note, supra note 17, at 413 n.93.
80. Block, 468 U.S. at 586. "ITihere is a valid, rational connection between a ban
on contact visits and internal security of a detention facility .... Contact visits...
open the institution to the introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband...
[that can be passed] to an inmate unnoticed by even the most vigilant observers." Id
81. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984) (upholding prison's ban on
contact visits under reasonableness standard); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550 (1979)
(analyzing restriction of prisoners' first amendment rights under reasonableness stan-
dard); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (applying rea-
sonableness analysis to challenged limitations on prisoners' first amendment rights);
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1974) (prison regulations prohibiting media in-
terviews with prison inmates evaluated with reference to reasonableness analysis).
82. Block, 468 U.S. at 586; Bell, 441 U.S. at 550; Jones, 433 U.S. at 129; Pell, 417 U.S.
at 826-27.
83. Block, 468 U.S. at 588; Bell, 441 U.S. at 551; Jones, 433 U.S. at 133; Pell, 417 U.S.
at 831-32.
84. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). "If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved the ques-
tion . . .we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitu-
tional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." Id, at 89.
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B. Turner v. Safley
1. The Issue Presented by Turner
Turner involved a class action suit brought by prison inmates to de-
termine the constitutionality of regulations regarding inmate corre-
spondence.85 The challenged regulations permitted correspondence
between inmates regarding legal matters and correspondence be-
tween inmates and immediate family members who were inmates in
other correctional institutions.86 Other correspondence between in-
mates, however, was permitted only if the classification/treatment
team of each inmate found it to be in the best interests of the in-
volved parties.8 7 The rule, as practiced, prohibited inmates from
writing to nonfamily inmates.88 Thus, this case dealt strictly with
"prisoners' rights" and did not implicate the rights of free citizens.8 9
In other words, this case squarely presented the issue that Martinez
expressly avoided:90 the formulation of a standard of review for pris-
oners' constitutional claims that was "responsive both to the 'policy
of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need
to protect constitutional rights.' "91
2. The Turner Test
Given this situation, the Court in Turner held that the standard of
85. Id at 81-82. The action actually involved two challenges: correspondence re-
strictions and marriage restrictions. Id. However, this article focuses only on the rul-
ings in the case that pertain to correspondence restrictions.
86. Id.
87. Id (quoting Brief for Appellant at 34, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (No.
87-1344)). Testimony at trial indicated that the determination permitting inmates to
correspond was "based upon team members' familiarity with the psychological reports,
conduct violations, and progress reports ... in the inmates' files, rather than on indi-
vidual review of each piece of mail." Id. at 82.
88. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82 (quoting Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 591 (W.D.
Mo. 1984)).
89. Cf. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984) (challenged regulations banned
contact visits between inmates and free citizens); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(challenged regulation prevented receipt of hardback books mailed to prisoners from
free citizens other than book clubs, publishers, or bookstores); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (challenged regulations prohibited bulk mailings
from outside sources, ie., free citizens to prison inmates); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1984) (challenged regulations prohibited face-to-face interviews between prison in-
mates and free citizens who were members of the media); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974) (challenged regulations concerned correspondence between prisoners
and free citizens).
90. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text; see also Martinez, 416 U.S. at
408-09.
91. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (quoting Martinerz, 416 U.S. at 406).
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review for prison regulations infringing on prisoners' constitutional
rights was that "the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."92 The Court stated that the reason-
ableness standard was more appropriate than a strict scrutiny analy-
sis because of the inherent flexibility in a reasonableness standard, a
flexibility that the Court viewed as necessary in dealing with prison
administration.93
The Turner reasonableness standard is determined by four factors.
Under the first factor, a "'valid rational connection' between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put for-
ward to justify it" must exist.94 The connection between the regula-
tion and the interest must not be so remote as to render the
regulation arbitrary or irrational.95 The second factor concerns
whether there are alternative means of exercising the right being in-
fringed upon.96 When alternate means do exist, the courts should be
particularly deferential to the corrections officials in evaluating the
validity of the regulation.97
The third Turner factor involves whether an accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have an impact upon other inmates
and guards, or on the allocation of prison resources generally.98 In
evaluating this factor, courts should give particular deference to the
decisions of the corrections officials if accommodation of the asserted
right will have a significant effect on staff or fellow inmates.99 The
92. Id, at 89. Security, institutional discipline, and rehabilitation generally are
considered legitimate penological objectives. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822-23.
93. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Turner Court claimed that such a standard is nec-
essary in order to have "'the prison administration, and not the courts .... make the
difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.'" Id (quoting Jones, 433 U.S.
at 128). Moreover, the Court stated that "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their
ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intracta-
ble problems of prison administration." Id,
94. 1& (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
95. L at 89-90.
96. Id at 90. Simply because alternative avenues of restriction are more desirable
than the restricted ones does not make the restriction unconstitutional. See Jones, 433
U.S. at 130 n.6. Nor is the loss of a cost advantage in the restricted means of exercising
a right a sufficient ground for invalidating a regulation. See id& at 130-31.
97. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 131; Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 827 (1974)). The Court derived this second factor from the rationale it used
in Pell, in which it upheld regulations banning media interviews with specific inmates
because other means were available for the inmates to communicate with society. Pell,
417 U.S. at 824-25; see also Jones, 433 U.S. at 131 (noting that although regulation re-
stricted some forms of communication, the prisoners' union had other means to com-
municate). See generally supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (discussing Pell and
Jones).
98. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. "In the necessarily closed environment of the correc-
tional institution, few changes will have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on
the use of the prison's limited resources for preserving institutional order." Id
99. Id.; cf Jones, 433 U.S. at 132-33. "Prison life, and relations between the in-
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final Turner factor is an evaluation of alternatives. "[The absence of
ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regu-
lation."10o Conversely, the existence of available easy alternatives
may be evidence that a regulation is not reasonable1O1 While this is
not considered a least restrictive alternative test, if an inmate can
identify an alternative that is more accommodating to prisoners'
rights and exacts only a de minimis cost to valid penological interests,
that alternative will be taken as evidence that the regulation does not
satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.102
In applying the Turner test to the regulation prohibiting inmate-to-
inmate correspondence, the Court upheld the regulation as reason-
ably related to legitimate security interests. 0 3 The Turner Court
found that the prohibition of inmate-to-inmate correspondence was
logically related to officials' fears of inmate communication of escape
plans and future violent acts.'0 4 The Court held that the alternative
proposed by the inmates, simply monitoring inmate correspondence,
imposed more than a de minimis burden on the pursuit of legitimate
corrections goals, and, consequently, the regulation reflected legiti-
mate penological concerns. 105 The Court also held that the regula-
tion was content neutral in its application.106
mates themselves and between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the
ever present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration." Id at 132 (citing
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-62 (1974)).
100. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587 (1984)).
101. Id The Turner Court stated that the existence of alternatives may indicate
that the regulation in question is an exaggerated response to prison concerns. Id.; see
also Pell, 417 U.S. at 827 (courts should defer to the judgments of prison officials con-
cerning security matters unless substantial evidence indicates that officials exagger-
ated those concerns).
102. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. This factor places the burden of showing another alter-
native squarely on the prisoner, and, as such, is another indication of the level of defer-
ence to prison officials. The Court did not specify whether an inmate making a
showing of a ready alternative could invalidate a regulation if the other three Turner
factors support the regulation's reasonableness.
103. Id, at 91-93.
104. Id. at 91. Witnesses stated that the Missouri Division of Corrections had a
growing prison gang problem, and that restricting gang communications by limiting
correspondence between gang members was an important element in combatting the
problem. Id. Further, because the facility provided protective custody for certain in-
mates, prison officials feared the use of correspondence could compromise protective
custody. Id
105. Id. at 93. Prison officials felt it would be impossible to read all inter-inmate
mail, leaving open the possibility that some dangerous messages would slip through.
Id. Even if all the mail could be read, prison officials feared the inmates' use of jargon
or codes to disguise their real messages. Id
106. Id. Although the Court did not elaborate on this statement, presumably con-
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When Thornburgh came before the Court, the Martinez and Tur-
ner standards of review were the two standards used by the courts in
determining prisoners' correspondence rights.07 Turner's creation of
a standard of review for regulations limiting only prisoners' constitu-
tional rights did not overrule Martinez because the Martinez Court
expressly avoided that issue.'0 8 The Martinez standard applied to
regulations affecting the rights of free citizens as well as prisoners. 09
Therefore, after Turner, the appropriate standard of review appar-
ently is determined by whose rights were affected by the regulations,
free citizens or prisoners."10
III. FACTS
While no specific facts were given by the Supreme Court, save that
Thornburgh v. Abbott was brought by prisoners from Marion Federal
Penitentiary,"' the basis for Thornburgh is found in certain Federal
Bureau of Prisons (FBP) regulations. These FBP regulations permit
federal prisoners to receive publications nl2 from the "outside.""i 3
tent-neutrality was found because the challenged regulation, as practiced, prohibited
all correspondence between nonfamily inmates, regardless of the content of the corre-
spondence. Id. at 82.
107. Cases adhering to the Martinez standard include: Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1030 (2d Cir. 1985); Car-
penter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751,
755 (7th Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Ward, 458 F. Supp. 546, 558 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Cofone v.
Manson, 409 F. Supp. 1033, 1039 (D. Conn. 1976); McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186,
1189 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
Cases following Turner include: Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1248 (5th Cir. 1989);
Mumin v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055, 1056 (5th Cir. 1988); Card v. Dugger, 709 F. Supp. 1098,
1103 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Blankenship v. Gunter, 707 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (D. Neb. 1988); Vallina v. Meese, 704 F.
Supp. 769, 772 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
108. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
109. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408 (noting that "[mlail censorship implicates more
than the right of prisoners"). In formulating its standard of review, the Martinez
Court looked "not to cases involving questions of 'prisoners' rights,' but to decisions of
this Court dealing with the general problem of incidental restrictions on First Amend-
ment liberties imposed in furtherance of legitimate governmental activities." Id. at
409.
110. The Martinez standard was especially formulated to protect the rights of free
citizens affected by prison regulations. I&. at 408-09. However, it would appear that
the Martinez standard also was applied to prison regulations affecting prisoners as
well as free citizens. Turner, on the other hand, was concerned with a prison regula-
tion that affected only prisoners and, thus, created a standard that should be applied
only when prisoners' rights are at stake. Turner, 482 U.S. at 81-82.
111. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989). The majority in Thornburgh
does not explain anything about the facts of the case beyond the challenged regula-
tions. In his dissent, however, Justice Stevens does mention that the challenge was
brought by prisoners from Marion Federal Penitentiary, and that one of the publica-
tions in question was Labyrinth. Id. at 1885-86 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting);
see also supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
112. A "publication" is defined as "a book (for example, novel, instructional man-
ual), or a single issue of a magazine or newspaper, plus such other materials addressed
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The FBP regulations, however, also authorize prison officials to re-
ject incoming publications in particular circumstances. 114 A publica-
tion may be rejected only if it is found to be "detrimental to the
security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might fa-
cilitate criminal activity.""15 A publication may not be rejected
" 'solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social
or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant.' '116
Each issue of a publication must be reviewed separately, and the war-
den is prohibited from creating a list of excluded publications. n 7
The regulations also provide procedural safeguards for the recipi-
ent and the sender of the publication. The warden is the only person
who may reject a publication, but the warden may designate staff to
screen and approve incoming publications." 8 If something is with-
held, the inmate must be informed promptly, in writing, of the rea-
sons for the rejection," 9 and a copy of the rejection letter must be
to a specific inmate as advertising brochures, flyers, and catalogues." 28 C.F.R.
§ 540.70(a) (1988).
113. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1876.
114. Id (incoming publications can be rejected if they are found to be detrimental
to institutional security.) See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
115. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1876 n.1.
Publications which may be rejected by a warden include but are not limited to
publications which meet one of the following criteria:
(1) It depicts or describes procedures for the construction or use of weap-
ons, ammunition, bombs or incendiary devices;
(2) It depicts, encourages, or describes methods of escape from correctional
facilities, or contains blueprints, drawings or similar descriptions of Bureau of
Prisons institutions;
(3) It depicts or describes procedures for the brewing of alcoholic beverages,
or the manufacture of drugs;
(4) It is written in code;
(5) It depicts, describes or encourages activities which may lead to the use
of physical violence or group disruption;
(6) It encourages or instructs in the commission of criminal activity;
(7) It is sexually explicit material which by its nature or content poses a
threat to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution, or facilitates
criminal activity.
28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988).
116. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1877 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988)).
117. Id (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(c) (1988)). Further guidance on the subject of sex-
ually explicit material has been supplied by Program Statement No. 5266.5, which al-
lows a warden to reject sexually explicit materials dealing with homosexuality,
bestiality, sadomasochism, and sex with children. See id at n.6.
118. 28 C.F.R. § 540.70(b) (1988).
119. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1877-78.
Where a publication is found unacceptable, the Warden shall promptly advise
the inmate in writing of the decision and the reasons for it. The notice must
contain reference to the specific article(s) or material(s) considered objection-
able. The Warden shall permit the inmate an opportunity to review this ma-
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sent to the publisher or sender of the rejected publication.120 In addi-
tion to these safeguards, the publisher or sender may seek an in-
dependent review of the rejection decision, 12' while the inmate can
pursue an internal appeals process.' 22
Also challenged in this action was the all-or-nothing rule. 23 Under
this rule, a prison must reject the entire publication even if just one
page or article is found unacceptable under the FBP regulations; 2 4 it
cannot simply censor the offensive page or article.
Based on the above, a class of inmates and publishers claimed that
enforcement of the FBP regulations violated their first amendment
rights12s to send and receive publications under the standard of re-
view espoused by the Court in Procunier v. Martinez. 26 They
mounted a facial challenge to the regulations that allowed mail cen-
sorship and an as-applied challenge to the regulations' exclusion of
forty-six specific publications. 27 In deciding Thornburgh, the district
court did not utilize the Martinez standard, and upheld the regula-
terial for purposes of filing an appeal under the Administrative Remedy
Procedure unless such review may provide the inmate with information of a
nature which is deemed to pose a threat or detriment to the security, good or-
der or discipline of the institution or to encourage or instruct in criminal
activity.
28 C.F.R. § 540.71(d) (1988).
120. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1878.
The Warden shall provide the publisher or sender of an unacceptable publica-
tion a copy of the rejection letter. The Warden shall advise the publisher or
sender that he may obtain an independent review of the rejection by writing
to the Regional Director within 15 days of receipt of the rejection letter. The
Warden shall return the rejected publication to the publisher or sender of the
material unless the inmate indicates an intent to file an appeal under the Ad-
ministrative Remedy Procedure, in which case the Warden shall retain the re-
jected material at the institution for review. In case of appeal, if the rejection
is sustained, the rejected publication shall be returned when appeal or legal
use is completed.
28 C.F.R. § 540.71(e) (1988).
121. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(e) (1988).
122. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1878 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-.16 (1988)). Under
the Administrative Remedy Procedure, prisoners who have been unable to resolve
their difficulties informally may file formal written complaints. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(b)
(1988). Inmates who believe they would be adversely affected if their claims became
known at the prison have the option of filing their complaints with the Regional Di-
rector of the Bureau. Id. § 542.13(c). The Warden or Regional Director must respond
within 15 or 30 days, respectively. Id. § 542.14. An adverse decision by the Warden is
appealable to the Regional Director; an adverse decision by the Regional Director is
appealable to the General Counsel of the Bureau. Id, § 542.15.
123. The majority gives the all-or-nothing rule very little attention, preferring in-
stead to defer to the district court on this issue. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884.
124. I& at 1891 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 540.71(e) (1988); supra note 120.
125. See supra note 7.
126, Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1876. The prisoners filed this lawsuit in May 1973. It
was certified as a class action in 1974, and joined by publishers in 1978. Id. at 1876 n.2;
see supra notes 34-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Martinez.
127. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1876.
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tions without addressing the forty-six specific exclusions.12 8 The
court of appeals, however, applied the Martinez standard,129 found
the regulations lacking, and remanded the case for a specific determi-
nation of the propriety of the forty-six exclusions. 3 0
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
As indicated in the lower court decisions, the outcome of Thorn-
burgh was dependent upon the standard of review adopted by the
Court.1 3 1 The Martinez standard, being less deferential to prison of-
ficials than later cases,132 would invalidate the regulations, as indi-
cated by the court of appeals' decision. 33 On the other hand, the
more deferential reasonableness standard adopted in the cases fol-
lowing Martinez, and, most particularly, in Turner v. Safiey,134
would uphold the regulations. Therefore, the Court's first task was
to decide which standard of review to apply to the regulations in this
case.
A. The Selection of the Turner Standard of Review
The Thornburgh Court began its opinion with a discussion of the
Martinez standard, which requires that the regulation in question ad-
vance an important or substantial government interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression, and that the limitation of first amend-
ment freedoms be no greater than necessary to protect the particular
governmental interest involved. 3 5 The Court stressed that this stan-
dard did not deprive corrections officials of the discretion necessary
to protect the particular governmental interest at stake.136 The
Court then stated, however, that the reasonableness standard
128. I&
129. Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "We find no holding that
the tects for prison censorship of a publication on the basis of content, having an im-
pact on the rights of the publisher, are different from those stated in Martinez." Id,
130. Id. at 1175-76. The Abbott court recognized that with the passage of time and
changes in circumstances, the question of the rejection of any specific magazine might
have become moot, and accounted for that in its order on remand. Id.
131. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 46-52, 81-84 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
134. 482 U.S. 78 (1987); see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
135. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1879 (1989). The Court, however, gave
some indication that its reference to Martinez is merely historical. "Martinez was our
first significant decision regarding First Amendment rights in the prison context." Id.
136. Id "It is clear... that we did not deprive prison officials of the degree of dis-
cretion necessary to vindicate 'the particular governmental interest involved.'" Id.
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adopted after Martinez was inspired by a concern that Martinez es-
tablished a standard of strict or heightened scrutiny. 3 7 The Court
viewed a standard of strict scrutiny as "not appropriate for considera-
tion of regulations that are centrally concerned with the maintenance
of order and security within prisons."s 8
Because the perceived Martinez standard was "too readily under-
stood as failing to afford prison officials sufficient discretion"139 in
their task of protecting prison security, the Court rejected Martinez
in favor of Turner.140 In rejecting Martinez, the Court stressed that
the focus of the review is not on the identities of the parties allegedly
harmed, such as free citizens incidentally affected by prison regula-
tions, but on the regulations themselves, and how they relate to legit-
imate penological interests.141 Thus, the Court adopted the Turner
test and held that a regulation is valid if "reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests."142
By adopting the reasonableness standard of Turner concerning in-
coming publications, the Court limited Martinez to regulations con-
cerning outgoing prison correspondence. 143 The Court reasoned that
because there are fewer security risks inherent in outgoing mail than
in incoming correspondence or publications, 4 4 the stricter test of
137. Id. "Martinez might be too readily understood as establishing a standard of
'strict' or 'heightened' scrutiny, and .... could be (and had been) read to require a
strict 'least restrictive alternative' analysis, without sufficient sensitivity to the need
for discretion in meeting legitimate prison needs." Id. at 1879-80 (citations omitted);
see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
138. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1879. The Court chose not to focus on the fact that
the regulations at issue in both Martinez and Thornburgh affected the rights of non-
prisoners, preferring instead to emphasize the impact of the regulations on a reason-
able relation to legitimate penological objectives. Id. at 1879 n.9.
139. Id, at 1881. Thus, the Court took a standard that had been formulated specifi-
cally to preserve discretion in the prison officials, and broadened that discretion even
more. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
This approach is especially interesting when compared with the view that "prison
mail regulations operate as prior restraints, and, therefore, bear 'a heavy presumption
against [their] constitutional validity.'" Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First
Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87, 105-11 (1971) (quoting New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)).
140. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1881. The Court justified its position by stating: "We
adopt the Turner standard in this case with confidence that, as petitioners here have
asserted, 'a reasonableness standard is not toothless.'" Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1882
(quoting Petition for Certiorari at 17 n.10).
141. Id. at 1879 n.9. This represents a complete turnabout from the Martinez focus
on the identities of the parties affected by the prison regulations. See supra notes 36-
37 and accompanying text.
142. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1881 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
143. Id.
144. Id.
The implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a cate-
gorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials. Any
attempt to justify a similar categorical distinction between incoming corre-
spondence from prisoners (to which we applied a reasonableness standard in
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Martinez is justified in order to avoid unnecessarily limiting prison-
ers' first amendment rights. 4 5
B. The Application of the Turner Standard
The Turner reasonableness standard provides that a regulation is
valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.1 46 The
test is applied with the aid of four factors: (1) the governmental ob-
jective underlying the regulations must be legitimate and neutral,
and the regulations rationally related to that objective;4 7 (2) the
existence of alternative means for the prisoners to exercise their re-
maining rights must be considered; 48 (3) the court must take into ac-
count the impact that accommodation of the asserted right would
have on guards and other prison inmates;1 49 and (4) the existence of
obvious, easy alternatives must be appraised.'5 0 The Court carefully
applied these factors in Thornburgh.
The first factor, the legitimacy and neutrality of the governmental
objective and the rational relationship of the regulation to that objec-
tive, is actually a combination of concerns. In applying this factor,
the Court easily disposed of the requirement that the governmental
objective be legitimate. The Court found that the objective of the
regulation was undoubtedly legitimate' 5 ' as it was aimed at protect-
ing prison security.' 52 The Court engaged in a more lengthy discus-
sion of the neutrality requirement, noting that, at first glance, the
regulations seem to be content-based restrictions because only the
content of the publication would make it a security risk. The Court
then went on to explain, however, that neutrality, as required by
Turner) and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners would likely prove
futile, and we do not invite it.
Id,
145. Id. On the other hand, the Court viewed the Turner test as providing a
greater flexibility that will enable prison officials to conduct their legitimate penologi-
cal objectives with greater efficiency. Id at 1881-82; see also note 93 and accompanying
text.
146. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
147. Id. at 89-90; see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
148. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; see also supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
149. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
150. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; see also supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
151. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1882 (1989).
152. Id, The Court, however, did not explain how it reached its conclusion that the
regulation was expressly aimed at protecting prison security. Although the Court did
not cite Turner, it may have relied on its reasoning in Turner that a logical connection
exists between the correspondence regulation and prison security interests. See Tur-
ner, 482 U.S. at 91.
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Turner, is established when the regulation operates in furtherance of
a governmental interest that is "unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression." 153 This requirement is fulfilled when the "prison adminis-
trators draw distinctions between publications solely on the basis of
their potential implications for prison security."'154
Having found the regulation to be both neutral and legitimate, the
Court then considered whether a rational relationship existed be-
tween the regulation and the governmental objective it furthered.
The Court found that a rational relationship did exist for two rea-
sons. First, the Court stated that incoming publications clearly pose a
security threat because, even if the articles they contain do not lead
to violence, they could exacerbate tensions and lead to disorder.155
Perhaps realizing the tenuousness of this line of reasoning, the Court
offered a second reason: the fact that no publication may be excluded
by any person but the warden, and even the warden is restricted to
certain criteria for exclusion.156 The purpose of these restrictions is
to ensure that no publication is rejected unless the rejection is ration-
ally related to security concerns. For example, the regulations ex-
pressly forbid the warden from taking shortcuts that might lead to
needless exclusions, such as creating a list of automatically excluded
publications.57
The second Turner factor concerns the availability of alternative
means for the prisoners to exercise their restricted rights. The
Thornburgh Court noted that both Turner and O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz158 indicated that the right in question must be viewed
153. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1882. The determination to reject a publication was
based on content, but only to the extent that the content of the publication had poten-
tial implications for prison safety. Applied in such a manner, the regulations were
considered to be neutral in the technical sense used in Turner. Id.
154. Id. In contrast, the censorship in Martinez was content-based because the reg-
ulations in that case allowed prison officials and employees to exercise personal beliefs
and prejudices as a basis for censorship. Thus, in Martinez, correspondence was cen-
sored based on its content, without a clear relation between content and prison secur-
ity. Id. at 1883 n.14; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974).
155. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1883. The Court gave no basis for reaching this con-
clusion, beyond the statement that the "District Court properly found that publica-
tions can present a security threat .... Id. at 1883 (emphasis added). The Court also
did not explain why it concluded that the district court reached its findings "properly."
156. Id. These restrictions are set forth in 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.70(b), 540.71(b), (d), (e)
(1988). The Court was comforted by the individualized nature of the determinations as
to acceptability of publications required by the regulation. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at
1883. Apparently, the Court saw the warden as being completely bound by the regula-
tions, and unlikely to make an incorrect determination as to the acceptability of a
publication.
157. See 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(c) (1988) (express prohibition against establishing an ex-
cluded list of publications).
158. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (reasonableness standard used to review infringements of
prisoners' free exercise of rights).
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broadly.159 In Turner, for example, the Court did not require that
prisoners be afforded other means of communicating with inmates at
other institutions; the Court merely held that it was enough that
other means of communication remained available to them (and not
necessarily other means of communicating with prisoners at other in-
stitutions).160 Similarly, in O'Lone, the Court refused to uphold Mus-
lim prisoners' right to participate in one particular religious
ceremony because, alternatively, they could practice their free exer-
cise right through various other Muslim religious ceremonies. 161 Ap-
plying this broad reading of "alternative means" to exercise the right
in question, the Thornburgh Court found the second Turner factor to
be fulfilled because a broad range of publications were permitted to
be sent, received, and read, in addition to those that were rejected. 162
The third Turner factor involves the degree of impact that accom-
modation of the asserted right would have on others in the prison not
asserting constitutional rights, both inmates and guards. The Court
applied this factor in the following manner: As the publications are
rejected for fear that they will be distributed to the general inmate
population, creating disorder and a threat to security, the effect of ac-
tual distribution on all of the inmates and guards would be detrimen-
tal. This is a situation in which the general prison population would
be impacted by the accommodation of the right asserted.163 The
weakness in this analysis, however, is the likelihood that circulation
159. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1883.
160. Id. The Turner Court had found that the regulation at issue did not com-
pletely abridge the prisoner's freedom of expression, but merely barred communica-
tion with a limited class of people (ie., inmates at other institutions) with whom
officials had reasonable cause to be concerned. Turner, 482 U.S. at 92. Thus, by
broadly drawing the rights of the prisoners, such as in the right to communicate, the
Court enabled the regulation to withstand first amendment scrutiny.
161. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 351. Again, the Court was drawing the threatened right
broadly. In O'Lone, it was drawn as the right to practice the Muslim religion, thus en-
abling the challenged regulation to pass constitutional scrutiny. Were the right drawn
narrowly, as simply the right to take part in the Jumu'ah service, it probably would
not have passed muster. See generally Religious Free Exercise, supra note 18, at 476.
162. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884. But see id at 1890 (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Stevens was concerned that some of the banned publications were
the only avenue for conveying a particularly unconventional message, making it irrele-
vant that other publications circulate freely. Id (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
163. Id at 1884. The Court feared the kind of "ripple effect" that concerned the
Court in Turner. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 92 (concern that the inmate-to-inmate corre-
spondence would cause disturbances affecting more than just corresponding inmates);
cf Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977).
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of the rejected publications would actually cause a security threat. 6 4
The final Turner factor addresses the existence of obvious, less re-
strictive alternatives as evidence that the regulation is an exagger-
ated response to prison concerns. 165 Because no such alternative was
presented, the Court held that the regulations were not an exagger-
ated response to prison concerns. 16 6 In sum, the Court resolved all of
the factors comprising the Turner reasonableness standard in favor
of the challenged regulations.167
The Court remanded the as-applied challenge of the forty-six spe-
cifically rejected publications for a determination of the validity of
the rejection.168 The Court did rule, however, on the "all-or-nothing
rule,"'1 69 which permits the warden to reject an entire publication be-
cause of one offensive article, rather than merely censoring the arti-
cle.170 Here, the Court deferred to the district court's finding171 that
deleting portions of the publication would cause considerably more
discontent than rejecting the entire publication.172 The Court
stressed that when prison officials can demonstrate that they rejected
a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that
it would lead to greater harm, they have demonstrated that their
practice is not an exaggerated response under Turner.173 Unfortu-
nately, however, the prison officials in Thornburgh did not show any
164. The rejected publications should be only those found potentially detrimental
to order and security. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884. The Court believed that the
class of excluded publications should be those publications most likely to circulate. Id
165. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
166. Thornburgh, 109 S, Ct. at 1884 ("[T]hese regulations, on their face, are not an
'exaggerated response' to the problem at hand: no obvious, easy alternative has been
established.").
167. The original challenge brought by the inmates was both facial and as-applied.
Id. at 1876. The greatest part of the majority's opinion was concerned with the facial
challenge. Id at 1878-84. The as-applied challenge was directed at 46 specifically ex-
cluded publications, about which there was a mootness question as the passage of time
had changed the circumstances that led to their initial exclusion. Id, at 1885; see Ab-
bott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
168. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1885. The remand actually was phrased in terms of
an analysis of the challenge to the exclusion of any of the 46 originally excluded publi-
cations "as to which there remains a live controversy." Id.; see supra note 167.
169. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884.
170. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
171. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884. But see id, at 1891 n.17 (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting) (stating that the district court had no basis for its finding). Justice Ste-
vens presented testimony on the record and from a deposition transcript that indicated
that no support existed for petitioners' position that inmate discontent with selective
censoring would threaten prison security. Id, (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
172. Id. at 1884. This is reminiscent of the Court's finding that publications can be
a security threat. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (Court makes no attempt
to ascertain the veracity of the district court's holding).
173. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884. The problem with this reasoning is that the
prison officials did not demonstrate anything, let alone that they had rejected a less
restrictive alternative than the all-or-nothing rule. See supra note 171 and accompany-
ing text; see also intfra note 208 and accompanying text.
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grounds for fearing that merely censoring offensive portions of a pub-
lication would create greater harm than censoring the entire publica-
tion.174 As if to bolster its decision, in light of its lack of foundation,
the Court added administrative convenience as an additional factor
for consideration,175 leading to the unmistakable inference that the
Court upheld the all-or-nothing rule merely for administrative
convenience.176
In sum, the Court applied the Turner test to the regulations at is-
sue in Thornburgh. This decision was inspired by a possibly errone-
ous fear that Martinez established a standard of strict or heightened
scrutiny. 177 The Thornburgh decision also was encouraged by a de-
sire to give prison officials wide discretion in their task of protecting
prison security, and the Turner standard of review provides more dis-
cretion to prison officials than Martinez.178 Thus, the Turner stan-
dard, formulated for pure prisoners' rights issues, was applied to
Thornburgh, despite the fact that Thornburgh, like Martinez, in-
volved the constitutional rights of both prisoners and free citizens.
By applying Turner, the Court held that the challenged regula-
tions 79 and the warden's use of the all-or-nothing rule were facially
valid.180 The Court, however, remanded the as-applied challenge
concerning the forty-six specifically rejected publications for a deter-
mination of the validity of the rejection.' 81
C. Justice Stevens' Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, in a strongly worded separate opinion, concurred
174. See supra notes 171, 173.
175. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884. The Court stated: "Furthermore, the adminis-
trative inconvenience of this proposed alternative [to censor only the offensive pages,
and not the entire publication] is also a factor to be considered, and adds additional
support to the District Court's conclusion that petitioners were not obligated to adopt
it." Id, (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549 (1979)).
176. This presumption is created by the facts set forth in Justice Stevens' dissent
indicating that the prison officials' creation and enforcement of the all-or-nothing rule
was completely without foundation in concerns of prison security. Thornburgh, 109 S.
Ct. at 1891 n.17 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). If no security-based founda-
tion exists for the all-or-nothing rule, then the rule must be based on the second rea-
son mentioned by the Court-administrative convenience.
177. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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with the majority on only one point.'8 2 He agreed that the district
court's carte blanche deference to the findings of the prison officials
was improper.183 Thus, Justice Stevens concurred only with the ma-
jority's decision to remand for a case-by-case review of the forty-six
specifically excluded publications.I8 4 This limited concurrence, how-
ever, was eclipsed by Justice Stevens' disagreement with all of the
majority's other findings.185
i. The Abandonment of Martinez
Justice Stevens strongly disapproved of the majority's use of the
Turner standard rather than the Martinez standard in its resolution
of Thornburgh. Justice Stevens viewed Thornburgh as being more
closely related to Martinez because they both wer# concerned with
the rights of free citizens.18 6 While Martinez invof'ved the screening
and censorship of outgoing prisoner correspondence, both Martinez
and Thornburgh recognized that the rights of free citizens are af-
fected when regulations are imposed upon prisoner correspon-
dence.' 8 7 The standard in Turner, however, was formulated without
consideration of the rights of free citizen correspondents because the
regulations were limited to inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 8 8
Justice Stevens also noted that lower courts routinely have applied
the Martinez standard when reviewing limitations not only on corre-
spondence, but also on communications such as the publications at is-
sue in Thornburgh.L89 The lower courts, validating some restrictions
182. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1885 (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
183. Id. at 1886 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
I cannot agree, however, with either [the Court's] holding that another finding
of "reasonableness" will justify censorship or its premature approval of the
Bureau's regulations. These latter determinations upset precedent in a head-
long rush to strip inmates of all but a vestige of free communication with the
world beyond the prison gate.
Id (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84
(1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
422 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir.
1944) (per curiam)).
184. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1886 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The
district court had found the suppression of the forty-six specifically excluded publica-
tions to be reasonable, and thus sustained their exclusion. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting). The Supreme Court remanded for a case-by-case review. Id. at 1885.
185. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1886 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
186. Justice Stevens emphasized that Thornburgh, like Martinez, was concerned
with the rights of prisoners and nonprisoners. Id at 1887 (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting). Turner, on the other hand, was concerned solely with the rights of prison-
ers. Id at 1888 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
187. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; see also Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct.
at 1886 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
188. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text; see also Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct.
at 1888 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
189. See Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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and invalidating others,190 have indicated that the Martinez standard
"does not deprive prison officials of the discretion necessary to per-
form their . . . tasks."191 The Thornburgh majority also expressly
recognized that Martinez does not deprive prison officials of their dis-
cretion.192 Given these facts, Justice Stevens found it inexplicable
that the Court limited Martinez to outgoing mail and applied Turner
in this case. 193
2. The Application of Turner
Justice Stevens feared that the Turner reasonableness standard
adopted by the Court "too easily may be interpreted to authorize ar-
bitrary rejections of literature addressed to inmates."194 He also was
troubled by the fact that the Martinez standard does not take into ac-
count the rights of nonprisoners.195 Justice Stevens asserted that
"[L]ower courts routinely have applied [Martinez's] standard to review limitations not
only on correspondence between inmates and private citizens, but also on communica-
tions-such as the newsletters, magazines, and books at issue-between inmates and
publishers." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Lawson v. Dugger, 840
F.2d 781 (11th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 840 F.2d 779 (1988) (per curiam), vacated, 109 S.
Ct. 2096 (1989); Valiant-Bey v. Morris, 829 F.2d 1441 (8th Cir. 1987); Murphy v. Mis-
souri Dep't. of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987); Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d
787 (9th Cir. 1982); Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1980); Brooks v. Seiter,
779 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1985); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978); Aikens v.
Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976); Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1975)).
190. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Wilson, 814 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1987); Travis v. Norris, 805
F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1986); Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1983); Vodicka v.
Phelps, 624 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1980); Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977).
191. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). If the
Martinez standard deprived prison officials of the discretion necessary to perform their
tasks, every challenged regulation would be invalidated by the courts.
192. Id. at 1879 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority stated that
Martinez did not deprive prison officials of the discretion necessary to vindicate and
protect the government interests at issue. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
193. Id. at 1887 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). "[The majority recognizes
that Martinez does not deprive prison officials of their discretion.] Inexplicably, it
then partially overrules Martinez by limiting its scope to outgoing mail; letters and
publications sent to prisoners now are subject only to review for 'reasonableness.'" Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
194. Id. at 1889 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Stevens' was con-
cerned that a reasonableness standard creates an easy means of upholding first amend-
ment restrictions based on speculative security risks and administrative convenience,
rather than on specific evidence indicating the restrictions are necessary for the fur-
therance of an important governmental interest. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 101 n.1 (1987)).
195. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1889 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Stevens believed that the Court's acceptance of the prison officials' asserted need for
"'broad discretion' to prevent internal disorder" creates a presumption that the rejec-
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provisions which allow publications to be rejected if their contents
are " 'detrimental' to 'security, good order, or discipline' or 'might fa-
cilitate criminal activity'"196 are impermissibly ambiguous,197 and
give free rein to prison officials to censor incoming publications.19s
Further, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's acceptance of
the prison officials' assertion that they need broad discretion to pre-
vent internal disorder created a presumption that all rejections pur-
suant to the regulations are reasonable.199 Accordingly, he concluded
that this presumption will replace the meaningful scrutiny of consti-
tutional claims in the prison setting.200 To support this claim, Justice
Stevens cited the testimony of a mail clerk which indicated that pub-
lications were rejected on the basis of personal prejudices or categori-
cal assumptions, rather than individualized assessments of risk.201 In
addition, he stated that some of the rejected publications may be the
tion of publications is reasonable. This presumption, Justice Stevens noted, provides
less judicial protection of publishers' rights than is required by the first amendment.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
196. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988));
see supra note 115.
197. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1889 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). In as-
sessing this regulation, Justice Stevens agreed with the earlier court of appeals holding
in this case. The appellate court stated:
Although the introductory paragraph of [28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988)] ap-
pears at first to limit the Warden's authority to rejecting material "deter-
mined detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution,"
it goes on to provide: "or if it might facilitate criminal activity." "[M]ight fa-
cilitate" permits a far looser causal nexus between expression and proscribed
conduct than "encourages." Moreover, the term "detrimental" is susceptible
of different meanings ....
Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1988)).
198. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1889 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The
terms "detrimental" and "might facilitate" are so malleable and open to interpretation
that there is little relation left between the enforcement of the regulations and the
feared conduct being prevented. Id (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). This
leaves the warden virtually unchecked in his censorship of incoming publications. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
199. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. Further, Justice Stevens stated
that no evidence supports the majority's assumption that any of the publications will
be circulated among the prison population, much less that such feared circulation
would cause "ripples of disruption." Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1890 (Stevens, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
200. "I am concerned that the Court today too readily 'substitute[s] the rhetoric of
judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims in the prison set-
ting.' " Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1890 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting
Black v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Cf O'Lone
v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 358 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 142-43 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
201. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1890 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). In
addition, Justice Stevens cited some explanations given for the rejection of separate
publications. They were remarkably similar, leading to suspicions that they were, es-
sentially, form rejections. Id. at 1890 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
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only medium for a particularly unconventional message, making it ir-
relevant that the regulations permit prisoner access to other publica-
tions.202 Finally, Justice Stevens noted that there was no evidence
that an incoming publication ever caused a security or even a discipli-
nary problem.203 In fact, some publications rejected by the warden at
Marion Federal Penitentiary were delivered without incident to in-
mates in other prisons. 20 4
3. The All-or-Nothing Rule
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's holding that the all-
or-nothing rule is reasonable.205 "[A]fter 16 years of litigation peti-
tioners have failed to develop an argument that tells us anything
about the assumed security or administrative justification for this
rule."206 The majority did not analyze the district court's finding that
the rule was reasonable, 20 7 deferring instead to the lower court's
202. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1890 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); see
supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. The availability of alternative means of ex-
ercising the right infringed upon is a factor in the analysis of the reasonableness of a
regulation impacting correspondence under Turner. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
90 (1987); see also Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1883 (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
203. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1890 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
204. Id (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Brief for Appellant at 60, 99,
116-17). Justice Stevens was convinced that under either the Martinez standard or the
more deferential "reasonableness" standard of Turner, the regulations at issue are an
impermissibly exaggerated response to security concerns. Id, (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
205. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1891-92 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Jus-
tice Stevens again sided with the court of appeals, and against the majority, in agreeing
with the finding that "rejection of the balance [of the publication] is not 'generally nec-
essary' to protect the legitimate governmental interest involved in the portion properly
rejected." Id& (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Abbott v. Meese, 824
F.2d 1166, 1173-74 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
206. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1891 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Stevens quoted in its entirety the discussion of the record that led to the district
court's finding that the all-or-nothing rule was reasonable. Id at 1891 n.17 (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting). This discussion proffered no evidence that the inmates
would be more discontent with the practice of censoring portions of a publication than
with the practice of rejecting the entire publication. Id& (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
In fact, one of the defendant prison officials in the court of appeals admitted that
there was "really no reason for not deleting the offending material and turning over
the balance to the inmate .... Abbott, 824 F.2d at 1174 (emphasis added).
207. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1891 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Be-
cause the majority did not apply the Martinez test, it felt relieved of the obligation to
question the district court's finding that the all-or-nothing rule was reasonably
founded. I. at 1884 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). This glib evasion on the
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"'finding' of a security threat that even prison officials admitted to
be nonexistent." 208 In Justice Stevens' view, the majority's primary
justification for the all-or-nothing rule is administrative conven-
ience,209 which is insufficient as a matter of law under either the
Turner reasonableness standard or the Martinez standard.210 Justice
Stevens stated that the majority's holding regarding the all-or-noth-
ing rule "highlights the likelihood that an attitude of broad judicial
deference, coupled with a 'reasonableness' standard, will provide in-
adequate protection for the rights at stake."21 '
In short, Justice Stevens believed that the Court should have de-
cided Thornburgh under the Martinez standard of review because
Thornburgh was more closely related to Martinez than to Turner.21 2
Further, Justice Stevens viewed the application of the Turner stan-
dard of review as creating a broad deference to decisions made by
prison officials, a deference that will replace meaningful constitu-
tional scrutiny in the prison setting.213 His view is corroborated by
the majority's validation of the all-or-nothing rule, despite the fact
that prison officials could not identify a need for such a rule.214
V. IMPACT
The most immediate impact of this decision will be felt on remand,
when the as-applied challenge will be considered in regard to the
forty-six specifically rejected publications.215 The district court can
be expected to uphold the regulations as applied to the rejected pub-
lications because the Thornburgh Court's use of the Turner standard
of review clearly sends a message to the lower courts that it prefers
part of the nation's highest court is remarkable. See infra note 208 and accompanying
text.
208. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1891 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
id. at 1891 n.17 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
209. Id, at 1891-92 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Brief for Appel-
lant at 41, 68). "[G]eneral speculation that some administrative burden might ensue
should not be sufficient to justify a meat-ax abridgment of the First Amendment
rights of either a free citizen or a prison inmate." Id. at 1892 (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting).
210. Id, (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Because the prison officials are re-
quired to read an article before rejecting it, the extra few seconds required to clip an
article can hardly be of constitutional significance. Id (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
211. 1& (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Thus, Justice Stevens believed
that the reasonableness standard was "toothless." Id. at 1892 n.18 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
212. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
215. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1885. The Court remanded the 46 specifically re-
jected publications "as to which there remains a live controversy" to determine the va-
lidity of their rejections.
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to defer to the decisions of prison officials whenever possible.2 16 The
most obvious example of the Court's deferential bias is the upholding
of the all-or-nothing rule in the face of an admitted lack of evidence
even hinting at its necessity.2 17 With this kind of precedent from the
Supreme Court, the district court has no basis upon which to invali-
date the FBP regulations as applied to the forty-six specifically ex-
cluded publications.
In a broader sense, the deference in this case is likely to turn the
tide of prison constitutional review back to its pre-Martinez, highly
deferential position.218 Martinez was the first prisoners' rights case
to break the precedent of judicial deference to the decisions of prison
officials.219 The Thornburgh Court explicitly stated that it chose to
apply the Turner standard of review because Turner allowed more
deference to the decisions of prison officials than Martinez.220 The
Court made this decision despite the fact that Martinez is the factual
equivalent of Thornburgh with a standard of review formulated for
precisely the issues presented by Thornburgh.22 1 In addition, the ac-
ceptance of prison officials' unwarranted allegations, as in the all-or-
nothing rule, 2 22 is a very strong example of the Supreme Court not
only advocating deference, but applying it as well. This precedent set
by Thornburgh will undoubtedly turn constitutional prison review
back to its original highly deferential position.
Thornburgh also specifically limited Martinez to situations involv-
ing outgoing prisoner mail.223 All other regulations involving pris-
oner correspondence are governed by Turner.224 A problem created
216. The selection of the Turner standard of review is inescapably a selection of a
standard that gives great flexibility to prison officials in performing their tasks. See
supra note 84 and accompanying text. Arguably, the selection of the Turner standard
of review can be seen as a return to the Court's pre-Martinez attitude of hands-off def-
erence to the problems of prison administration. See supra notes 17-18 and accompa-
nying text.
217. See supra notes 155, 164, 206 and accompanying text.
218. Prior to Martinez, most courts adopted a hands-off attitude towards prison ad-
ministration problems. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Such a hands-
off attitude provides the ultimate in deferential approaches.
219. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-07 (1974).
220. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
221. Both Martinez and Thornburgh involved prison regulations censoring mail be-
tween inmates and free citizens. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408-09; see also Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1876-78 (1989). These regulations create an incidental re-
striction on the free speech rights of free citizens. See supra notes 186-88 and accompa-
nying text.
222. See supra notes 155, 164, 206 and accompanying text.
223. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1881.
224. Id. at 1881-82.
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by this dichotomy is that the sensitivity with which Martinez treated
the rights of free citizens corresponding to prisoners did not exist in
Turner or Thornburgh.225 Thus, in all cases except those regulating
only outgoing mail, the first amendment rights of free citizens will be
subject to incidental restriction by prison regulations without consid-
eration by judicial review.226 Free citizens corresponding with or
mailing subscriptions to prisoners will have their free speech rights
infringed by regulations that are subject to review by a standard that
was formulated only for inmate-to-inmate correspondence. 22 7
Finally, application of the all-or-nothing rule results in a prison of-
ficial's rejection of an entire publication because of one offensive arti-
cle, or, as the case may be, one offensive page.228 A prison inmate
can be denied an entire subscription publication because, in one offi-
cial's opinion, one article is too sensitive to be delivered to the pris-
oner, who then might disseminate it to the entire prison
population.229 Under the Turner standard of review, as applied in
Thornburgh, the inmate has no redress in this situation. The Court
has afforded so much deference to prison officials in their application
of the FBP regulations that prisoners effectively are stripped of their
first amendment free speech right to receive information. Thus, af-
ter Thornburgh, an inmate may be denied a publication on little more
than an official's whim.
VI. CONCLUSION
By using the Turner standard of review, rather than Martinez, the
Court applied the incorrect standard of review to Thornburgh. This
decision is inexplicable in light of the fact that the Martinez standard
was promulgated for precisely the situation presented in Thornburgh,
where the rights of free citizens are affected by regulations imposed
on prison inmates. The less demanding Turner standard provides no
protection for free citizens' rights that are incidentally affected by
prison regulations. This situation is exacerbated by the Court's adop-
tion of a standard of broad deference to the decisions of prison offi-
cials. Prison officials are left with the freedom to enforce or apply
FBP regulations in any manner they choose, without fear of being
second-guessed by the courts. Prison inmates now are faced with the
225. The Turner standard of review did not consider incidental restrictions on the
rights of free citizens, as did Martinez. Turner was concerned only with pure prison-
ers' rights. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
226. This is the only logical conclusion, considering that the standard for review set
forth in Thornburgh, that of Turner, does not take into account the rights of free citi-
zens. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
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narrowing of one of their few remaining freedoms-that of receiving
information-with little possibility of redress. The Court appears to
be, as Justice Stevens feared, "in a headlong rush to strip inmates of
all but a vestige of free communication with the world beyond the
prison gate."23 0
MEGAN M. MCDONALD
230. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1886 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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